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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ELIGIBILITY IN 
CASES OF VOLUNTARY SEPARATION 
Julia Fleming* 
Abstract: Washington State’s Employment Security Act allows individuals who 
voluntarily left their jobs to be eligible for unemployment benefits if they quit their position 
with “good cause.” In structuring this Act, the state’s legislature has confined the definition of 
good cause to a one-size-fits-all list consisting of eleven circumstances. Consequently, if a 
situation arises that forces an individual to quit their job, yet does not fall into one of those 
eleven outlined circumstances, the Employment Security Department will disqualify the 
individual from receiving unemployment benefits. In comparison with other states’ 
unemployment laws, Washington’s system is quite limited, allowing no discretion under even 
the most compelling of circumstances. Such a statutory structure does not allow the state to 
truly effectuate the Act’s purpose of both providing benefits to those “unemployed through no 
fault of their own” and “reducing involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby 
to the minimum.”1 Therefore, Washington’s legislature must act to alleviate this harm and 
grant individuals the unemployment benefits they deserve. In developing a solution, this 
Comment compares the good cause unemployment laws of Oregon, North Dakota, and 
Pennsylvania. Through this analysis, this Comment proposes that Washington repeal its 
exclusive good cause list and adopt a standard that defines “good cause” as cause of such a 
necessitous and compelling nature that would force a reasonable and prudent person of normal 
sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense, to leave their employment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of federal and state unemployment compensation programs is 
twofold: counter recessions and alleviate hardships the unemployed face.2 
Society cannot downplay the advantages that unemployment benefits 
provide by countering the negative effects of recessions. Where jobs and 
wages are lost, money is pumped back into the economy to help stabilize 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank 
Professor Spitzer for his guidance throughout the drafting process, as well as the Washington Law 
Review editorial staff for their hard work and support in helping fine-tune my Comment at each step 
along the way. 
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2020). 
2. Deborah Maranville, Unemployment Insurance Meets Globalization and the Modern Workforce, 
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2004); HEATHER BOUSHEY & JORDAN EIZENGA, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, TOWARD A STRONG UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM: THE CASE FOR AN 
EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE 1 (2011) (“The purpose of the unemployment insurance system, as 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt noted upon signing the legislation into law, is both to alleviate 
hardships for the unemployed and to counter recessions.”). 
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spending and the market flow as individuals search for work.3 During the 
Great Recession of 2008, unemployment compensation helped replace 
about one-fifth of the shortfall in the nation’s gross domestic product 
(GDP).4 Additionally, society cannot discount the lifeboat that 
unemployment benefits serve for individuals struggling with job loss. 
Currently, millions of Americans depend on unemployment checks to 
keep them afloat as COVID-19 continues to plague the country and 
economy, forcing businesses to close and leaving workers stranded.5 
America’s unemployment insurance system, however, has failed to 
stay up to date with a changing labor force and economy.6 Prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic that took hold of the country in 2020, 
unemployment benefit eligibility had become so limited that a mere one 
in four jobless workers received benefits.7 With little to no change to keep 
pace with the twenty-first century, most state programs remain unprepared 
for fluctuations in the economy, let alone a recession.8 America’s historic 
period of economic expansion and prosperity after the Great Recession 
has come to a halt,9 and now is the time to take the necessary steps to 
update Washington’s unemployment compensation laws.10 Therefore, the 
legislature must take preventive measures to protect the economy during 
recessions and working families from the hardships of unemployment. 
The goal underlying unemployment benefits is to insure workers who 
become jobless “through no fault of their own,” meaning that the 
employee is not to blame for their job loss.11 Generally, an employee’s 
unemployment is through no fault of their own if their employer 
discharged them absent any misconduct or they left their position with 
 
3. BOUSHEY & EIZENGA, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
4. Id. at 5. 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. RACHEL WEST, INDIVAR DUTTA-GUPTA, KALI GRANT, MELISSA BOTEACH, CLAIRE MCKENNA 
& JUDY CONTI, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHERE STATES ARE AND WHERE THEY SHOULD BE ON 
UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS 1 (2016) [hereinafter WHERE STATES ARE]. 
7. RACHEL WEST, INDIVAR DUTTA-GUPTA, KALI GRANT, MELISSA BOTEACH, CLAIRE MCKENNA 
& JUDY CONTI, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN 
AMERICA: MODERNIZING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND ESTABLISHING A JOBSEEKER’S 
ALLOWANCE 1 (2016) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA]. 
8. WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
9. Chart Book: Tracking the Post-Great Recession Economy, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-book-tracking-the-post-
great-recession-economy [https://perma.cc/EL6U-SPDF] (“That expansion [following the Great 
Recession] continued into 2020, becoming the longest on record, but a sharp contraction in economic 
activity arising from COVID-19 ended it.”). 
10. See WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 9. 
11. BOUSHEY & EIZENGA, supra note 2, at 1 (emphasis added). 
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“good cause.”12 Standards for determining whether an employee quit with 
good cause vary from state to state.13 Absent a good cause finding, an 
individual considered at fault for their unemployment will be ineligible 
for benefits.14 
In particular, Washington’s unemployment law—found in the 
Employment Security Act15—defines good cause in a way that is narrow 
and rule-based.16 Currently, the law lists eleven exclusive reasons that 
constitute good cause for an individual to leave their job.17 If a former 
employee left their job for a qualifying reason, they may be eligible for 
benefits. Conversely, individuals who leave their job for reasons not 
enumerated in the law are ineligible and disqualified from receiving 
unemployment benefits. An infinite number of situations can arise that 
would compel an employee to leave their job. By limiting the reasons that 
constitute good cause to a one-size-fits-all list, the state’s ability to grant 
benefits to employees who quit their job under otherwise compelling 
circumstances is restricted. 
In turn, the limited good cause definition impedes Washington’s ability 
to effectuate the Employment Security Act’s purpose. The Act’s preamble 
states that unemployment compensation shall “be used for the benefit of 
persons unemployed through no fault of their own” to “reduc[e] 
involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to the 
minimum.”18 Circumstances frequently arise that compel individuals to 
leave their jobs. Oftentimes, however, these reasons do not constitute 
good cause under the current statutory scheme and thus disqualify 
individuals from benefits. With its exclusive good cause list, Washington 
does not provide benefits for all workers who become “unemployed 
 
12. Unemployment Benefits If You Quit Your Job, EMP. SEC. DEP’T [hereinafter If You Quit Your 
Job], https://esd.wa.gov/unemployment/quit [https://perma.cc/59ZM-TZ2L]; Were You Laid Off or 
Fired?, EMP. SEC. DEP’T [hereinafter Were You Laid Off or Fired?], 
https://esd.wa.gov/unemployment/laid-off-or-fired [https://perma.cc/HUE3-38WX]. 
13. See WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 7–8; BOUSHEY & EIZENGA, supra note 2, at 6. 
14. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (2020); If You Quit Your Job, supra note 12. 
15. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.01.005–.98.110. 
16. See id. § 50.20.050. 
17. Id. In Washington, employees have good cause to quit their job if: (1) they accepted another 
bona fide job offer; (2) they had to deal with their own illness or the illness or death of an immediate 
family member; (3) they relocated due to their spouse’s or domestic partner’s employment; (4) they 
had to protect themselves or an immediate family member from domestic violence; (5) their 
compensation was reduced by at least 25%; (6) their work hours were reduced by at least 25%; 
(7) their worksite location changed and greatly increased the distance of their commute; (8) their 
worksite safety deteriorated; (9) there were illegal activities at the workplace; (10) their work changed 
in a manner that violated the employee’s religious or moral beliefs; or (11) they entered an 
apprenticeship program approved by the state. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(i)–(xi). 
18. Id. § 50.01.010. 
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through no fault of their own.”19 To effectuate the law’s intent, 
Washington must extend unemployment benefits eligibility for 
individuals who voluntarily quit beyond the present enumerated reasons. 
By comparing other states’ unemployment systems to Washington’s, 
this Comment proposes a standard-based good cause provision that would 
effectuate Washington’s intent to compensate its faultless workers. Part I 
begins by outlining the development of unemployment benefits both 
nationally and locally. Specifically, this Part provides background 
information on the unemployment benefits application process and 
describes the evolution of Washington’s good cause provision. Part II 
then explains the important role unemployment insurance plays as an 
economic buffer during recessions. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and mandated business closures that have resulted, the country is 
witnessing first-hand the positive impact unemployment benefits have on 
individuals and families by helping to keep them on their feet. Next, 
Part III compares the voluntary separation laws of Oregon, North Dakota, 
and Pennsylvania to those of Washington. This Part compares specific 
cases from these other states to analogous Washington decisions to 
discern how different definitions of good cause produce varying results 
under similar factual circumstances.20 Lastly, Part IV concludes by 
proposing a good cause standard the Washington legislature should adopt. 
This proposed standard would enable Washington to fulfill the purpose of 
its unemployment compensation laws and prepare for future economic 
fluctuations. 
I. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ON NATIONAL AND 
LOCAL LEVELS 
America’s unemployment insurance system does not require the 
implementation of certain criteria that is uniform across all states 
regarding, for example, the amount of weekly benefits or the duration of 
benefit eligibility.21 Instead, states have tremendous flexibility to regulate 
their own standards of program eligibility and financing.22 Because 
unemployment insurance developed as a partnership between federal and 
state governments, both federal and state payroll taxes continue to fund 
 
19. Id. 
20. While no two cases present the same facts or situation, I attempted to find sufficiently similar 
cases to illustrate how different laws produce different eligibility determinations. However, I do not 
assert that a different standard would guarantee a different outcome in any case. 
21. WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 2. 
22. Id. 
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unemployment insurance to this day.23 Although now accepted as an 
integral part of society, America’s system of unemployment 
compensation endured a rather long and tumultuous journey in gaining 
national support.24 
A. The Social Security Act of 1935 
America’s interest in unemployment compensation began to grow in 
the early 1900s, shortly after Britain enacted its unemployment insurance 
act in 1911.25 Throughout this period, instituting a national system of 
unemployment insurance did not garner immediate support from states or 
any traction to become part of the law.26 Rather, interest in such a program 
fluctuated over time and was largely countercyclical to the economy’s 
wellbeing, with interest growing in times of economic decline and 
diminishing in times of economic prosperity.27 
During the depression of 1914–1915, the outbreak of World War I 
triggered a global financial crisis as governments prepared for war and 
“imposed drastic controls to safeguard their banking system and national 
finances.”28 In response, the national government created emergency 
commissions that supported the idea of a “nationwide and coordinated 
system of public employment offices.”29 Even with the commissions’ 
endorsement, however, calls for such a system went unanswered as the 
depression subsided and economic boom followed.30 
 
23. STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 72. 
24. See Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 22–31 
(1945). 
25. Id. at 22. Although Britain’s unemployment act provided a source that American scholars could 
analyze and study, discussions concerning unemployment insurance had already begun in the U.S. 
prior to 1911. Id. For example, at the American Association for Labor Legislation’s (AALL) First 
Annual Meeting in 1907, “Professor Henry R. Seager of Columbia University discussed the ‘Ghent 
system’ of unemployment insurance,” a system in which trade unions—rather than the government—
help to deliver welfare payments. Id.; DAVID MADLAND & MALKIE WALL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
AMERICAN GHENT: DESIGNING PROGRAMS TO STRENGTHEN UNIONS AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES 1 (2019). 
26. Witte, supra note 24, at 22–23. 
27. Id. Even main proponents of unemployment insurance, including the AALL, seemed to lose 
interest in such a program once periods of economic boom followed depression. Id. at 23.  
28. Richard Roberts, The Unknown Financial Crisis of 1914, OUPBLOG (Nov. 25, 2013), 
https://blog.oup.com/2013/11/unknown-financial-crisis-1914/ [https://perma.cc/GY67-JJVJ]. 
29. Witte, supra note 24, at 22–23. Together, the AALL and the American Association on 
Unemployment organized a National Conference on Unemployment. Id. at 22. At the conference’s 
second annual meeting, a draft of “A Practical Program for the Prevention of Unemployment in 
America” was presented and endorsed; this particular program would later be supported by the 
emergency commissions in response to the 1914–1915 depression. Id. at 22–23. 
30. Id. at 22–23. 
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Shortly thereafter, the brief but severe depression of 1920–1921 again 
reminded Americans of the suffering that results from high 
unemployment.31 This time, however, Americans “turned to remedies 
other than unemployment insurance.”32 Many business leaders pushed for 
individual corporations and trade associations to operate their own 
unemployment systems to avoid government involvement.33 Eventually, 
many companies adopted their own unemployment reserve systems, 
either internally or through joint company-union programs.34 
As the Great Depression took hold of the country in October 1929, 
Americans could no longer ignore their need for a system of 
unemployment relief.35 The national unemployment rate peaked in 1933 
at 25.2% and did not fall below 15% for nearly the rest of the decade.36 
Many workers became chronically unemployed, remaining jobless for a 
year or more and being turned away from employers for reasons ranging 
from “skepticism about their skills to outright racism.”37 Various 
legislative enactments during the New Deal era provided some individuals 
with work-relief programs, but most marginalized people—including 
older, nonwhite, and unskilled workers—continued to remain the most 
likely to be unemployed.38 
Finally, the federal government stepped in and enacted the Social 
Security Act of 1935.39 With doubts that the Constitution would permit 
the national government to establish a system of unemployment 
insurance, Congress passed the Social Security Act and structured it 
specifically to induce individual states to adopt their own unemployment 
legislation.40 At the time, the Social Security Act imposed a 3% excise 
payroll tax on employers with eight or more employees.41 However, 
employers could “offset their payments to state unemployment 
 
31. Id. at 23. 
32. Id.  
33. Id. at 25.  
34. Id. at 23. 
35. Id. at 24; Great Depression History, HISTORY (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.history.com/ 
topics/great-depression/great-depression-history [https://perma.cc/U7TW-RJ3V].  
36. Emily Toler, “Without Good Cause”: The Case for a Standard-Based Approach to 
Determining Worker Qualification for Unemployment Benefits, 89 WASH. L. REV. 559, 560 (2014). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 560–61. 
39. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 301–1397mm). For more information concerning the numerous proposals that eventually led to 
the Social Security Act, as well as the importance of the timing in which the legislation was finally 
enacted, see Witte, supra note 24, at 28–31. 
40. Witte, supra note 24, at 29. 
41. Id. at 32. 
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compensation funds up to 90 percent of the total tax” as long as states 
enacted their own legislation.42 Ultimately, this “federal-state” system of 
unemployment compensation encouraged states to adopt and administer 
their own unemployment laws, collect unemployment compensation 
funds, and deposit these funds in the United States Treasury for 
investment in United States securities.43 
Thus, after a series of recessions and the Great Depression, Congress 
finally pushed national legislation through to ensure that local American 
needs would be met during times of unemployment. In response to the 
Social Security Act’s 1935 passage, nearly all states enacted 
unemployment compensation laws by 1936.44 To top off the legislation’s 
success, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld as constitutional 
“both the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security 
Act and the state unemployment compensation laws.”45 
B. Washington’s Unemployment Compensation System and the 
Narrowing “Good Cause” Provision 
Shortly after the passage of the Social Security Act, the Washington 
legislature passed the Unemployment Compensation Act (the Act) in 
1937.46 The Act characterized “economic insecurity due to 
unemployment” as a “serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of 
the people of this state.”47 In the preamble, Washington’s legislature noted 
that the Act was to be “liberally construed for the purpose of reducing 
involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to the 
minimum.”48 Moreover, the legislature endeavored to “remedy the 
widespread employment situation . . . and to set up safeguards to prevent 
its recurrence” through “the compulsory setting aside of unemployment 
reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault 
of their own.”49 
 
42. Id. Currently, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) is 0.6% and “is assessed on a taxable 
wage base equal to the first $7,000 of an employee’s wages each year.” STRENGTHENING 
UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 73. For a more in-depth explanation of 
the joint funding by both states and the federal government, see id. 72–75. 
43. Witte, supra note 24, at 32.  
44. Id. at 33. Even prior to the Social Security Act’s enactment in 1935, six states had already 
passed unemployment compensation bills. Id. 
45. Id. at 34 (discussing Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)).  
46. Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574 (codified as amended 
at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110 (2020)). 
47. Id. ch. 162, § 2. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
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The Unemployment Compensation Act has undergone many changes 
since its enactment and is known today as the Employment Security Act.50 
The state’s Employment Security Department (ESD) administers the 
Act.51 A commissioner, serving as the head of ESD, has the power and 
authority to adopt, amend, or rescind rules and regulations pursuant to 
the Act.52 
Current employees who experienced a reduction in their work hours53 
or former employees who quit their job54 or were fired55 may seek 
unemployment compensation.56 These individuals, known as claimants, 
commence the process of seeking benefits by filing an application with 
ESD, which then issues a determination concerning the claimant’s 
eligibility.57 If a claimant is eligible, they may begin to receive 
unemployment benefits.58 Conversely, if ESD denies a claim, the claimant 
may appeal the decision and request a hearing with an administrative law 
judge (ALJ).59 After this hearing, which is usually held telephonically, the 
ALJ issues an order containing the ALJ’s findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and ultimate eligibility decision.60 
If a claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ’s order, they may file a 
petition for review with the Commissioner’s Review Office.61 At this 
stage, a Review Judge thoroughly reviews the entire record, including all 
testimony and documentary evidence, and issues a written Decision of 
 
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.005; see also Employment Security Act, ch. 8, § 24, 1953 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 884, 904. 
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.08.010. 
52. Id.; see also id. § 50.12.010. 
53. See id. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(vi). 
54. See id. § 50.20.050; If You Quit Your Job, supra note 12. 
55. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.060; Were You Laid Off or Fired?, supra note 12. 
56. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.010. 
57. Id.  § 50.20.140;  see  also  Unemployment  Benefits,  EMP.  SEC.  DEP’T,  https://esd.wa.gov/ 
unemployment [https://perma.cc/A85A-NMMG]. 
58. The employer has the opportunity to challenge an employee’s claim for unemployment 
benefits, however. See Dispute an Unemployment Benefits Claim, EMP. SEC. DEP’T, 
https://esd.wa.gov/about-employees/dispute-claim-filed [https://perma.cc/H3D3-H753]. Employers 
generally challenge a former employee’s grant of unemployment benefits because this will impact the 
employer’s experience-based tax, which is one of two components that makes up the employer’s state 
unemployment tax. See Unemployment Tax Rates FAQ, EMP. SEC. DEP’T, 
https://esd.wa.gov/employer-taxes/tax-rate-faq [https://perma.cc/MA45-7EEU]. 
59. Benefit Denials and Appeals, EMP. SEC. DEP’T, https://esd.wa.gov/unemployment/benefit-
denials-and-appeals [https://perma.cc/64U8-BRLR]. 
60. Id.; Commissioner’s Review Office, EMP. SEC. DEP’T [hereinafter Commissioner’s Review 
Office], https://esd.wa.gov/unemployment/commissioners-review-office [https://perma.cc/XD93-
N6EP]. 
61. Commissioner’s Review Office, supra note 60. 
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Commissioner.62 If a claimant still does not receive a favorable outcome, 
they may petition the Washington State courts for further review.63 
Claimants must meet certain eligibility requirements to receive 
benefits.64 For example, an individual must have worked at least 680 hours 
in the last year, be actively seeking employment, and be available to 
immediately accept any suitable work that is offered.65 Additionally, a 
claimant will be ineligible if they “left work voluntarily without good 
cause.”66 
The “good cause” language concerning an individual’s voluntary 
separation has been present in Washington’s unemployment statute since 
the original Act in 1937.67 Over time, the Act has undergone many 
significant changes, and the good cause disqualification and definition 
have become more limited with each modification.68 
In 1937, the original Act did not define good cause.69 Absent explicit 
guidance, ESD and Washington courts had broad discretion to interpret 
this phrase and grant benefits to those they thought fit the qualification.70 
The legislature first amended the Act in 1945.71 The amendment 
directed ESD to consider a number of factors in determining whether a 
claimant had left work with good cause, such as “the degree of risk 
involved to [the claimant’s] health, safety and morals”; their “physical 




64. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.010 (2020). An individual’s eligibility will require that they “have 
sufficient earnings history, [and] have paid into unemployment insurance via their employer’s payroll 
taxes.” STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 1. 
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.010; see also Basic Eligibility Requirements, EMP. SEC. DEP’T, 
https://esd.wa.gov/unemployment/basic-eligibility-requirements  [https://perma.cc/59WT-LEKJ]. 
Specifically, the Act requires a claimant to have worked at least 680 hours in their last “base year,” 
which is defined to mean “either the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters or the last 
four completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the individual’s benefit year.” 
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.020. 
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (noting disqualification for leaving work voluntarily without 
good cause). 
67. See Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, § 5(a), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574, 580. 
68. See Toler, supra note 36, at 569 (explaining that “as the legislature revised the statute, it 
consistently limited the circumstances that can constitute good cause and restricted administrative and 
judicial discretion to find it”). For a detailed analysis of Washington’s good cause provision 
throughout its evolution from a flexible, standard-based approach to its now limited, rule-based form, 
see id. at 569–89. 
69. Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, § 5(a). 
70. Toler, supra note 36, at 569. 
71. Act of Mar. 7, 1945, ch. 35, § 78, 1945 Wash. Sess. Laws 76, 116. 
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Commissioner may deem pertinent.”72 In particular, this “other factors”73 
provision gave the Commissioner discretion in considering additional 
extenuating factors that could account for good cause outside of the 
various factors outlined in the statute.74 Under this version of the Act, 
good cause determinations were very “fact-specific and standard-
based.”75 
In 1977, an additional amendment to the Act76 added further situations 
constituting good cause for leaving a job, some of which codified previous 
commissioner decisions.77 However, the amendment also allowed for the 
consideration of “other work connected factors,” which retained a degree 
of flexibility for the Commissioner’s and courts’ good cause 
determinations.78 In maintaining a system of case-specific eligibility 
determinations rather than a set of concrete rules, the legislature ensured 
that ESD and Washington courts liberally construed the unemployment 
compensation laws, thereby effectuating the statute’s purpose.79 
As time progressed, the legislature continued to amend the Act.80 With 
each amendment, the legislature added more situations to the definition of 




74. Toler, supra note 36, at 570; see, e.g., Judith L. Wright, No. 1173, 1974 WL 177542 (Emp. 
Sec. Comm’r Oct. 21, 1974) (finding good cause for voluntarily leaving work to preserve a 
relationship with children); William H. Haskins, No. 512, 1962 WL 76374 (Emp. Sec. Comm’r 
Aug. 30, 1962) (finding good cause for voluntarily leaving work to preserve a marriage in the face of 
divorce); Matison v. Hutt, 85 Wash. 2d 836, 539 P.2d 852 (1975) (finding good cause for voluntarily 
leaving work after a union decertification election rather than forfeiting health and pension benefits). 
75. Toler, supra note 36, at 575. 
76. Act of May 16, 1977, ch. 33, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 229, 231 
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b), 50.20.050(2)(b) (2020)). 
77. Toler, supra note 36, at 576. 
78. Act of May 16, 1977, ch. 33, sec. 4(3) (emphasis added). 
79. See Toler, supra note 36, at 576–77. Standard-based systems, in contrast with rules, “promote 
flexibility, [and] individualization,” while liberal construction “gives a statute more elbow room for 
the sake of achieving statutory purposes and goals.” Id. at 599 (quoting Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming 
to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 ALB. L. REV. 9, 38 (2000)). As a result, 
individualized eligibility determinations “allow the kind of flexibility that . . . . more effectively 
advance[s] the purpose of the [Employment Security] Act and unemployment compensation 
generally.” Id.  
80. The legislature amended the Act in 1980, throughout 1981 and 1982, and again in 1993, 2000, 
and 2002. See Toler, supra note 36, at 580–83. 
81. For example, in 1980, the legislature added a provision allowing for the death of an immediate 
family member to constitute good cause. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, ch. 74, sec. 5(2)(b), 1980 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 170, 174 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(ii), 
50.20.050(2)(b)(ii)). 
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provisions,82 and continued the “trend of limiting discretion.”83 By the 
early 2000s, Washington’s good cause framework was “well 
established.”84 Division I of the Court of Appeals succinctly recited the 
good cause framework during this period when it explained: 
To have good cause for severing employment so as to be eligible 
for benefits, an employee must leave work primarily because of 
work-connected factors of such compelling nature as to cause a 
reasonably prudent person to leave, after exhausting all 
reasonable, non-futile alternatives. The commissioner must 
consider only work-related factors brought about by 
the employer.85 
In 2003, the legislature enacted “a major revision” to Washington’s 
unemployment compensation laws, thereby disrupting ESD’s and the 
courts’ prior discretion.86 Around this time, many large Washington 
employers like Boeing were threatening to leave the state.87 These 
employers complained of Washington’s unfriendly business climate 
involving “high business and occupation taxes, high unemployment taxes, 
and a congested transportation system.”88 As a result, “many legislators 
were prepared to pass whatever legislation business demanded,” which 
consequently led to a more employer-friendly good cause provision.89 
Among the amendment’s changes included a specified list of ten 
situations that would provide an individual with good cause to leave 
work.90 During this period, an individual would have good cause to 
voluntarily leave work: (1) to “accept a bona fide offer of bona fide 
work”;91 (2) due to “the illness or disability of the claimant or the death, 
 
82. For example, the 1981 amendments added a list of factors to consider in determining whether 
work obtained is “of a bona fide nature,” Act of Apr. 20, 1981, ch. 35, sec. 4(1)(a)–(c), 1981 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 132, 135–36 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(a)(i)–(iii), 
50.20.050(2)(b)(i)–(iii)), and the 2000 amendments required a claimant who quit to relocate with their 
spouse to prove that the spouse’s relocation was “due to an employer-initiated mandatory transfer,” 
Act of Feb. 7, 2000, ch. 2, sec. 12(2)(c), 2000 Wash. Sess. Laws 16, 17. 
83. Toler, supra note 36, at 581. 
84. Id. at 583. 
85. Emps. of Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Emp. Sec. Dep’t, 128 Wash. App. 121, 130, 114 P.3d 675, 
680 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
86. Toler, supra note 36, at 583; see also Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 4, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d 
Spec. Sess. 2782 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.01.05–
50.98.110). 
87. Toler, supra note 36, at 583, n.222. 
88. Maranville, supra note 2, at 1140. 
89. Id.  
90. Act of June 20, 2003, sec. 4. 
91. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(i). 
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illness, or disability of a member of the claimant’s immediate family”;92 
(3) to “relocate for the spouse’s employment . . . due to a mandatory 
military transfer”;93 (4) to “protect the claimant or the claimant’s 
immediate family members from domestic violence . . . or stalking”;94 
(5) because “[t]he individual’s usual compensation was reduced by 
twenty-five percent or more”;95 (6) because “[t]he individual’s usual 
hours were reduced by twenty-five percent or more”;96 (7) because “[t]he 
individual’s worksite changed, [and] such change caused a material 
increase in distance or difficulty of travel”;97 (8) because “[t]he 
individual’s worksite safety deteriorated”;98 (9) due to “illegal activities 
in the individual’s worksite”;99 or (10) because “[t]he individual’s usual 
work was changed to work that violates the individual’s religious 
convictions or sincere moral beliefs.”100 
One question that soon arose, however, was whether the new list of 
good cause situations was exhaustive.101 First to address this question on 
appeal was Division II of the Court of Appeals in the 2005 case Starr v. 
Employment Security Department.102 Here, the court held that the 
amended Act “provide[d] the exclusive list of good cause reasons for 
voluntarily quitting employment that will not disqualify a claimant from 
receiving unemployment compensation benefits.”103 Notably, the 
Washington State Supreme Court denied Starr’s petition for review.104 
In 2008, however, the Washington State Supreme Court overruled 
Starr’s previous holding concerning the list’s exclusivity when reviewing 
 
92. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(ii). 
93. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(iii). 
94. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(iv). 
95. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(v). 
96. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(vi). 
97. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(vii). 
98. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(viii). 
99. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(ix). 
100. Id. at sec. 4(2)(b)(x). The eleventh reason that would be added in 2009 allowed for good cause 
when “[t]he individual left work to enter an apprenticeship program approved by the Washington 
state apprenticeship training council.” Act of May 18, 2009, ch. 493, sec 3(1)(b)(xi), (2)(b)(xi), 2009 
Wash. Sess. Laws 21, 23 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(xi), 
50.20.050(2)(b)(xi) (2020)). 
101. Toler, supra note 36, at 584. 
102. 130 Wash. App. 541, 123 P.3d 513 (2005). 
103. Id. at 551, 123 P.3d at 519 (emphasis added) (denying Starr unemployment benefits because 
his voluntary job separation in order to travel to Alaska to take custody of his grandchildren after their 
mother—Starr’s daughter—was incarcerated did not fall within the statute’s exclusive list of good 
cause reasons). 
104. Starr v. Emp. Sec. Dep’t, 157 Wash. 2d 1019, 142 P.2d 607 (2006) (denying petition 
for review). 
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Spain v. Employment Security Department.105 The Court noted that 
because the Act’s good cause provision was “not a model of clarity,” each 
interpretation regarding its exclusivity was reasonable.106 Nevertheless, 
the Court based its holding on the “words of the statute itself” that 
indicated a “difference in legislative intent” and led the Court to believe 
the legislature had intended the list to be non-exclusive.107 
The Court’s ruling did not last long, however. A little over a year after 
the Court’s Spain holding, the legislature swiftly responded by passing 
Senate Bill 5963.108 The 2009 amendment specified “that the reasons 
enumerated in the statute were the only reasons that could constitute good 
cause for leaving work.”109 
Currently, the Act closely resembles its 2003 version. Per the Act, an 
individual “has good cause and is not disqualified from benefits”110 when 
at least one of the eleven situations is present: (1) a claimant “left work to 
accept a bona fide offer of bona fide work”;111 (2) “[t]he separation was 
necessary because of the illness or disability of the claimant or the death, 
illness, or disability of a member of the claimant’s immediate family”;112 
(3) a claimant has “[l]eft work to relocate for the employment of a spouse 
or domestic partner”;113 (4) “[t]he separation was necessary to protect the 
claimant or the claimant’s immediate family members from domestic 
violence . . . or stalking”;114 (5) “[t]he individual’s usual compensation 
was reduced by twenty-five percent or more”;115 (6) “[t]he individual’s 
hours were reduced by twenty-five percent or more”;116 (7) a change in 
the individual’s worksite “caused a material increase in distance or 
 
105. 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (2008). 
106. Id. at 257, 185 P.3d at 1190. 
107. Id. at 259, 185 P.3d at 1192. In particular, the Court looked to the two key terms of “good 
cause” and “disqualified,” and recognized that it is an “elementary rule that where the Legislature 
uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference 
in legislative intent.” Id. Finding that “[s]uch different language is used here,” the Court stated “that 
the statutory list of nondisqualifying reasons for voluntarily leaving a job does not do double duty as 
an exclusive list of good cause reasons to leave a job.” Id. at 259–60, 1185 P.2d at 1191. 
108. Substitute S.B. 5963, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009). 
109. Toler, supra note 36, at 588 (emphasis in original); see Substitute S.B. 5963, sec. 3(2)(a) 
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(a) (2020)) (“Good cause reasons to leave 
work are limited to reasons listed in (b) of this subsection.”).  
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b). 
111. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(i) 
112. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(ii). 
113. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii). 
114. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iv). 
115. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(v). 
116. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(vi). 
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difficulty of travel”;117 (8) “[t]he individual’s worksite safety 
deteriorated”;118 (9) a claimant left because of “illegal activities in the 
individual’s worksite”;119 (10) “[t]he individual’s usual work was 
changed to work that violates the individual’s religious convictions or 
sincere moral beliefs”;120 or (11) “[t]he individual left work to enter [a 
state-approved] apprenticeship program.”121 Thus, ESD may deem 
claimants eligible for unemployment benefits after their voluntary 
resignation only if one of the aforementioned situations led to their job 
loss. Employees who leave their employment for other compelling 
reasons—ones that would force any reasonable person to quit, yet do not 
appear in the one-size-fits-all list of good cause situations—are 
consequently ineligible for unemployment benefits. With no discretion to 
account for other extenuating or compelling situations, ESD and 
Washington courts are unable to effectuate the statute’s purpose of 
awarding benefits to individuals “unemployed through no fault of their 
own.”122 
II. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION’S ECONOMIC ROLE 
DURING RECESSIONS AND IN THE FACE OF COVID-19 
Since its development during the Great Depression, unemployment 
insurance has served as a “bedrock of the nation’s social insurance 
system” and remained “an essential ingredient for economic security, 
shared prosperity, and a stable economy.”123 Leading up to 2020, 
American unemployment systems were not at the forefront of the nation’s 
mind or the topic of intense national discussion.124 This would soon 
change, however, and it would be too late for those unemployment 
systems in dire need of an update to be prepared for what would come.125 
At the beginning of 2020, the national unemployment rate hovered at 
 
117. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(vii). 
118. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(viii). 
119. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(ix). 
120. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(x). 
121. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(xi). 
122. Id. § 50.01.010. 
123. WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 1. 
124. See generally Alan Greenblatt, David Kidd & Tod Newcombe, The Biggest Issues to Watch 
in 2020, GOVERNING (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.governing.com/next/The-Biggest-Issues-to-
Watch-in-2020.html [https://perma.cc/N45Y-3KLW] (listing some of the biggest problems to watch 
for in 2020, among others, as abortion, climate, election security, net neutrality, and recession fears). 
125. See WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 1. 
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some of its lowest rates in the post-World War II era126—around 3.6% and 
3.5% in January and February of 2020, respectively.127 The economy had 
been experiencing a period of historic expansion and passed a 
record-setting time of ten years without undergoing a recession.128 
Such a period of growth and economic prosperity inevitably could not 
last forever, but the world did not foresee the reason for the downward 
spiral that would strike in early 2020. In March, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) characterized the global outbreak of COVID-19, the 
disease caused by a novel coronavirus, as a pandemic.129 Soon after, 
President Trump declared a state of national emergency130 as the country’s 
unemployment rate slowly increased to 4.4%.131 While businesses 
nationwide were forced to close their doors, the unemployment rate 
skyrocketed in April and hit 14.7% with just over twenty-three million 
people unemployed.132 With mandates that many industries remain closed 
or resume only limited operations, the unemployment rate failed to drop 
quickly or significantly after April; the U.S. Department of Labor reported 
national unemployment rates of 13.3%133 and 11.1%134 in May and June, 
respectively. In Washington, the state unemployment rate peaked at 
15.1% in May135 and diminished to 9.8% in June.136 
 
126. Rakesh Kochhar, Unemployment Rose Higher in Three Months of COVID-19 than It Did in 
Two Years of the Great Recession, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/11/unemployment-rose-higher-in-three-months-of-
covid-19-than-it-did-in-two-years-of-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/UCR8-SYFA]. 
127. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., PUB. NO. USDL-20-0521, THE EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION—MARCH 2020, at 6 tbl.A (2020) [hereinafter MARCH 2020 EMPLOYMENT SITUATION]. 
128. WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 1; Janna Herron, A Decade After the Big One, What 
Kind of Recession Will We Have Next?, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2019, 9:52 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/08/19/recession-what-does-mean-and-what-
like/2030642001/ [https://perma.cc/W26D-NPY8]. 
129. WHO Characterizes COVID-19 as a Pandemic, Post on Rolling Updates on Coronavirus 
Disease  (COVID-19),  WORLD  HEALTH  ORG.  (Mar.  11,  2020),  https://www.who.int/ 
emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen  [https://perma.cc/8ALQ-
GSGV]. Even as early as January 30, 2020, the WHO had declared the outbreak a “public health 
emergency of international concern,” which is the “highest level of alarm under international law.” Id.  
130. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/RY7K-HJR4]. 
131. MARCH 2020 EMPLOYMENT SITUATION, supra note 127, at 6 tbl.A.  
132. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., PUB. NO. USDL-20-0815, THE EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION—APRIL 2020, at 7 tbl.A (2020). 
133. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., PUB. NO. USDL-20-1140, THE EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION—MAY 2020, at 7 tbl.A (2020). 
134. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., PUB. NO. USDL-20-1310, THE EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION—JUNE 2020, at 7 tbl.A (2020). 
135. EMP. SEC. DEP’T, MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT REPORT: JUNE 2020, at 1 (2020). 
136. EMP. SEC. DEP’T, ESD FACTS & FIGURES: JULY 2020 (2020). 
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Given the federal economic stimulus check and millions of Americans 
filing for unemployment benefits for the first time, the importance of 
spending to stimulate and stabilize an economy may sound familiar.137 In 
times of economic downturn, unemployment compensation helps 
stabilize the economy by putting money into the hands of struggling 
families, which in turn creates demand in the local and national 
markets.138 Because unemployment benefits are typically spent rather than 
saved, this money helps fill the gap in overall consumption resulting from 
high unemployment rates.139 
Even had the COVID-19 pandemic not occurred, many states were due 
to update their unemployment insurance systems.140 State policy decisions 
have cut deep into benefit eligibility and consequently restricted 
unemployment compensation’s capacity as an automatic macroeconomic 
stabilizer.141 Moreover, the nation has both failed to sufficiently invest in 
unemployment insurance and update this vital system to keep pace with 
the twenty-first century.142 As a result, unemployment insurance’s reach 
within the workforce today is limited.143 In 2015, only 27.2% of 
unemployed workers nationwide were receiving benefits—a historic 
low.144 The COVID-19 pandemic and related economic downturn have 
thus emphasized the preexisting, critical need for expanding eligibility 
requirements for unemployment benefits. 
Expanding benefit eligibility is not a simple task, however.145 
Eligibility generally stems from an individual becoming unemployed 
through no fault of their own.146 This “no fault rule” exists primarily to 
prevent moral hazard,147 or “the concept that individuals have incentives 
to alter their behaviour when their risk or bad-decision making is borne 
 
137. Stimulus Check, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/ 
knowledge/economics/stimulus-check/ [https://perma.cc/N75X-8AJE]; see also U.S. Department of 
Labor Announces New Cares Act Guidance on Unemployment Insurance for States in Response to 
COVID-19 Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ 
eta/eta20200402-0 [https://perma.cc/BSD7-QSJK]. 
138. WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 1. 
139. BOUSHEY & EIZENGA, supra note 2, at 4. 
140. WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 1.  
141. STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
142. Id. at 1. 
143. Id. at 39. 
144. Id. 
145. BOUSHEY & EIZENGA, supra note 2, at 9. 
146. STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 37. 
147. Id. 
Fleming (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  5:09 PM 
2020] WASHINGTON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 293 
 
by others.”148 The idea is that unemployment benefits may induce 
individuals to leave their jobs unnecessarily and allow them to still receive 
wages.149 Such perverse incentives would consequently usher in “higher 
and potentially unsustainable program costs and undermin[e] the 
[unemployment compensation system]’s primary role as insurance.”150 
As a result, unemployment eligibility requirements must operate in a 
way that incentivizes employees to remain attached to their job. Research 
suggests that current unemployment insurance systems “fall[] far short of 
producing significant negative moral hazard consequences,”151 so 
expanding benefit eligibility with limitations in place will not increase the 
risk of individuals abusing the unemployment insurance system. 
Moreover, different states have developed unemployment compensation 
systems that provide the necessary benefits while still minimizing the 
risks associated with moral hazard.152 Consequently, comparative analysis 
of these programs is useful to identify the flaws of Washington’s approach 
as well as evaluate potential solutions to remedy any perverse incentives. 
III. STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMPARISON: 
OREGON, NORTH DAKOTA, AND PENNSYLVANIA 
VERSUS WASHINGTON 
Because the Social Security Act does not mandate that all states’ 
unemployment compensation systems operate in the same manner, states 
enjoy freedom in defining benefit eligibility.153 As a result, this variation 
provides a unique opportunity in which to analyze the operation of 
Washington’s eligibility criteria.154 Comparing voluntary separation 
circumstances under other state laws can thus highlight both how 
Washington’s current system produces its eligibility decisions and how 
other systems may achieve different desired results. 
Accordingly, this Comment compares the unemployment 
compensation systems of three states—Oregon, North Dakota, and 
 
148. Tejvan  Pettinger,  Moral  Hazard,  ECON.  HELP  (Nov.  6,  2019),  https://www. 
economicshelp.org/blog/105/economics/what-is-moral-hazard/ [https://perma.cc/LZ8B-VSB8]. 
149. STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 37. 
150. Id.  
151. Id. at 54. 
152. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 225–229 (discussing the limitations placed on North 
Dakota’s unemployment benefits eligibility, which in turn protect against moral hazard). 
153. See Witte, supra note 24, at 29–30; BOUSHEY & EIZENGA, supra note 2, at 6. 
154. For a table indicating which states’ laws utilize certain good cause provisions, see WHERE 
STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
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Pennsylvania—to the Washington system.155 After examining state-by-
state data on unemployment eligibility, criteria, and recipiency rates, or 
the percentage of unemployed individuals receiving benefits,156 I selected 
Oregon, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania as comparators for 
several reasons. 
First, I sought to sample a state with a similar geographic region as 
Washington. Geographical regions may experience similar employment 
practices as well as geographical unemployment rates.157 These concepts 
justified the selection of Washington’s Pacific Northwest 
neighbor, Oregon. 
Second, I selected a state with an outlier recipiency rate. North 
Dakota’s recipiency rate stands out because it far exceeds the national 
average: whereas the national recipiency rate hovers around 28%, an 
impressive 70% of North Dakota jobless workers receive unemployment 
benefits.158 While the state’s eligibility standards may not be the sole 
reason its recipiency rates are unusually high, this statistic nevertheless 
stands out. A high recipiency rate may be advantageous by placing money 
into the hands of more individuals to support the local economy, or such 
a rate could be disadvantageous based on the associated risk of moral 
hazard. Therefore, North Dakota’s outlier recipiency rate supported 
further exploration. 
Third, I sought to compare a state with a standard-based good cause 
determination, in comparison with Washington’s rule-based system. 
While both Oregon and North Dakota also present a standard-based 
approach, Pennsylvania’s unemployment statute has been recognized as 
“remarkable in a number of respects,” specifically given the “broad 
flexibility of its voluntary quits provision” and protection of care-giving 
workers from biased agency assumptions.159 Thus, Pennsylvania stood out 
as a good candidate for comparison with Washington’s relatively 
restrictive, rule-based system. 
 
155. While a wider state comparison could provide a more holistic proposal for Washington’s good 
cause provision, such an analysis is outside the scope of this Comment. 
156. STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 39. 
157. See Tejvan Pettinger, Geographical Unemployment, ECON. HELP (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/1416/unemployment/geographical-unemployment/ 
[https://perma.cc/RED3-XJAQ] (explaining that geographical unemployment can result from labor 
immobility or the decline of a regional industry). 
158. WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 11–12. 
159. Carolyn McConnell, No Fault of Her Own: Redressing Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination in the State Unemployment Compensation Systems, 62 LAB. L.J. 120, 126, 129 (2011).  
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A. Oregon’s Unemployment Insurance for Voluntary Resignations 
Under Oregon’s Employment Department Law,160 an individual will be 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if they “[v]oluntarily 
left work without good cause.”161 Although the statute does not explain 
what constitutes “good cause,”162 Oregon’s Employment Department has 
defined the phrase to mean a reason that would drive “a reasonable and 
prudent person of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common 
sense . . . [to] leave work.”163 Moreover, the reason for the employee’s 
voluntary resignation “must be of such gravity that the individual ha[d] 
no reasonable alternative but to leave work.”164 Unlike the Washington 
scheme—which outlines the exclusive reasons that constitute good 
cause—Oregon’s code specifies what does not constitute good cause. 
Leaving work without good cause in Oregon may include, but is not 
limited to: 
(A) Leaving suitable work to seek other work; 
(B) Leaving work rather than paying union membership dues; 
(C) Refusing to join a bona fide labor organization when 
membership therein was a condition of employment; 
(D) Leaving to attend school, unless required by law; 
(E) Willful or wantonly negligent failure to maintain a 
license . . . necessary to the performance of the occupation 
involved . . . ; 
(F) Resignation to avoid what would otherwise be a discharge for 
misconduct or potential discharge for misconduct; [or] 
(G) Leaving work for self employment.165 
Thus, workers will be ineligible for benefits if they leave work for one of 
these reasons or another that Oregon’s Employment Department does not 
consider to be good cause.166 
Provisions also guide good cause determinations when an individual 
 
160. OR. REV. STAT. § 657.005 (2020). 
161. Id. § 657.176(2)(c). 
162. Id. 
163. OR. ADMIN. R. 471-030-0038(4) (2020). “For an individual with a permanent or long-term 
‘physical or mental impairment’ . . . good cause for voluntarily leaving work is such that a reasonable 
and prudent person with the characteristics and qualities of such individual, would leave work.” Id.  
164. Id. Section 5(f) of the relevant Oregon Administrative Rule provides for situations, however, 
“[w]here the gravity of the situation experienced by the individual results from his or her own 
deliberate actions.” Id. at R. 471-030-0038(5)(f). 
165. Id. at R. 471-030-0038(5)(b)(A)–(G). 
166. Id.  
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voluntarily leaves employment “while on layoff status,”167 due to a 
“reduction in the rate of pay,”168 or due to a “reduction in hours.”169 
Further, Oregon law provides that “good cause includes, but is not limited 
to . . . compelling family reasons.”170 
Overall, Oregon’s unemployment laws utilize a reasonable person 
standard to determine when an individual voluntarily quits with good 
cause.171 Specifically, this objective standard inquires “whether a 
‘reasonable and prudent person’ would consider the situation so grave that 
he or she had no reasonable alternative to quitting.”172 
Unlike most other states, Oregon’s laws do not explicitly require an 
individual’s reason or cause of leaving employment to be related to their 
work. Instead, an employee may quit work “due to purely personal grave 
circumstances and not be disqualified from receiving benefits.”173 
Whether personal reasons constitute good cause in any situation is left as 
“a value judgment whose completion the legislature has entrusted to the 
[Employment] Division.”174 Consequently, good cause does not exclude 
personal reasons as long as they are “of sufficient gravity.”175 Therefore, 
both personal and job-related reasons “constitute ‘good cause’ if they are 
‘such that a reasonable and prudent person of normal sensitivity, 
exercising ordinary common sense, would leave work.’”176 
Nevertheless, Oregon’s requirement that there be “no reasonable 
alternative but to leave work”177 limits employees’ ability to voluntarily 
quit and receive unemployment benefits. For example, in Young v. 
Employment Department,178 the Oregon Court of Appeals found that a 
claimant who suffered an on-the-job injury requiring surgery lacked good 
cause because reasonable alternatives to resigning had existed.179 In 
 
167. Id. at R. 471-030-0038(5)(c). 
168. Id. at R. 471-030-0038(5)(d). 
169. Id. at R. 471-030-0038(5)(e). 
170. Id. at R. 471-030-0038(5)(g). 
171. McDowell v. Emp. Dep’t, 236 P.3d 722, 726 (Or. 2010). 
172. Id.; see also Perkins Coie, In Oregon, Quitters Sometimes Win, 18 OR. EMP. L. LETTER 1, 1 
(2011). 
173. EAB Decision 2015-EAB-0876 (Aug. 24, 2015). 
174. Sothras v. Emp. Div., 616 P.2d 524, 526 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Robb v. Emp. Div., 635 P.2d 
392, 393 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that Sothras stands for the principle that “the Employment 
Division may consider personal, non-job related problems in determining if an employee has ‘good 
cause’ for leaving his or her employment”). 
175. Sothras, 616 P.2d at 527. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. 13 P.3d 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). 
179. Id. 
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particular, the claimant failed to prove that “she would have been 
physically unable to return to her employment within a reasonable period 
of time,” “that there was no position for her to return to,” or that remaining 
on medical leave while receiving manager bonuses and medical benefits 
was “an unreasonable alternative.”180 As a result, Oregon’s system limits 
the risk of moral hazard by requiring claimants to exhaust all possible 
options prior to quitting. 
1. Case Comparison: Oregon vs. Washington 
Oregon and Washington serve as great comparators considering that 
their regional proximity may lend itself to similar employment practices 
and geographical unemployment rates. To illustrate how Oregon’s 
reasonable person standard in the voluntary separation context compares 
to Washington’s exclusive good cause list, it is helpful to compare the 
varying results of similar situations experienced in each state. 
a. Oregon’s Jane Doe Decision 
In August 2015, the Oregon Employment Appeals Board (EAB)181 
issued a decision allowing a worker to collect unemployment benefits 
after a stressful yet reasonable move to another city.182 Jane Doe worked 
and resided in Portland, Oregon.183 In March 2015, she became engaged 
to her fiancé who lived in Long Beach, Washington.184 Around this same 
time, Jane began living part-time in Long Beach with her fiancé and 
commuting roughly three hours each way to work in Portland several 
times a week.185 Because Jane could “not commute every day,” she 
continued maintaining a second home in the Portland area.186 
Soon, Jane began experiencing exhaustion and stress as a result of the 
commute and distance from her fiancé; the long distance in particular 
“began creating serious financial, emotional, and familial relationship 
issues.”187 At the end of April 2015, Jane decided to quit her job and live 
 
180. Id. at 1029–30. 
181. Oregon’s EAB is situated in the same position as the Washington Commissioner’s Review 
Office, in that the EAB has the power to review challenged unemployment claims. See OR. REV. 
STAT. § 657.685 (2020). 
182. EAB Decision 2015-EAB-0876 (Or. Aug. 24, 2015). Because this decision does not provide 
names, I will refer to this claimant as Jane Doe. 
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with her fiancé full-time in Long Beach, Washington.188 Because Jane’s 
fiancé had held a government job for the past seventeen years, earned a 
higher income, and received employer-paid retirement and other benefits, 
it “made more sense” for Jane to leave her lower-wage, administrative 
assistant position in Portland.189 Shortly after moving to Long Beach and 
filing for unemployment benefits in Oregon, the Employment Department 
found Jane ineligible and denied her application for benefits.190 
On review, an ALJ affirmed the denial of Jane’s benefits.191 In 
particular, the ALJ concluded that Jane had quit work without good cause 
because the circumstances that drove her to quit were not “compelling 
family reasons,” she enjoyed her job, and did not face a grave situation at 
work.192 
When reviewing the denial, however, the EAB set aside the ALJ’s 
decision, finding that Jane had voluntarily left work with good cause in 
order “to preserve her relationship with her fiancé.”193 After attempting to 
“retain her employment and relationship without moving to a location 
from which commuting was impracticable,” the strain that maintaining 
Jane’s employment placed on her relationship became too great.194 
Specifically, the EAB determined that: 
No reasonable and prudent person of normal sensitivity, 
exercising ordinary common sense, would continue working at a 
job that required her to maintain the expense of two households, 
commute up to three hours each direction to travel to work, and 
create “serious financial, emotional and familial relationship 
issues,” such that continuing to work jeopardized 
the relationship.195 





191. Id. at 1. 
192. Id. at 3. Jane’s job separation was technically determined to be a discharge; this is because 
after Jane orally notified and emailed her employer her two weeks’ notice of intent to resign, her 
employer terminated Jane’s position that same day and did not allow her to work through the notice 
period. Id. According to Oregon’s unemployment compensation law, such a situation must be 
analyzed as if the discharge did not occur. OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(8)(c) (2020). Therefore, the 
determination was viewed as a resignation and hinged on “whether or not claimant’s planned leaving 
was for good cause.” EAB Decision 2015-EAB-0876 at 3. 
193. EAB Decision 2015-EAB-0876 at 4. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
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reasons” good cause exception.196 Nonetheless, Oregon’s objective good 
cause standard allowed Jane to receive benefits based on what a 
reasonable person would do under the circumstances. 
b. Washington’s Travis Taron 
The Washington Commissioner’s Review Office reviewed a factually 
similar situation when considering Travis Taron.197 Travis Taron worked 
as a yard foreman in Kenmore, Washington, and lived in Lynnwood, 
Washington.198 In August 2015, Travis quit his job to relocate over 150 
miles to Yakima, Washington, “where his fiancée had obtained a job.”199 
Travis and his fiancée had been engaged since August 2014 and shared 
two young children.200 Because of their move to Yakima, Travis and his 
fiancée delayed their wedding and the couple was neither married nor 
registered as domestic partners at the time of Travis’s resignation.201 
Travis’s job separation closely resembled a codified good cause reason 
that permits a claimant to receive unemployment benefits if they “[l]eft 
work to relocate for the employment of a spouse or domestic partner that 
is outside the existing labor market area.”202 Along those lines, the 
Commissioner established that Travis had “left employment due to his 
fiancée’s new employment in Yakima, which was well outside of 
claimant’s labor market area.”203 However, because Travis was “neither 
married, nor was he in a domestic partnership, at the time he quit his 
employment,” the Commissioner found that Travis lacked good cause to 
quit his job and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits.204 
Thus, Travis’s unemployment eligibility determination depended on 
the precise legal status of his relationship.205 Because Travis did not 
technically relocate for his “spouse” or “domestic partner,” he could not 
 
196. OR. ADMIN. R. 471-030-0038(5)(g) (2020); see also id. at R. 471-030-0038(1)(e) (defining 
“compelling family reasons”). 
197. No. 1001, 2016 WL 9384209 (Emp. Sec. Dep’t Feb. 12, 2016). 
198. Id. at *1. 
199. Id.  
200. Id.  
201. Id.  
202. Id. at *2 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii) (2020)). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at *3. 
205. Id. at *2. In issuing this decision, the Commissioner noted that Black’s Law Dictionary 
defined the term “spouse” to mean “[o]ne’s husband or wife by lawful marriage,” while Washington 
law defined “domestic partner” as “two adults who meet the requirements of [Revised Code of 
Washington (RCW)] 26.60.030 and have been issued a certificate of state registered domestic 
partnership by the Washington secretary of state.” Id. (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 192-100-075 (2020)).  
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have good cause to leave his job.206 To relocate one’s life and employment 
for a mere fiancée proved insufficient. 
2. Derived Reasoning 
Different eligibility determinations resulted from similar circumstances 
in Washington and Oregon. The facts of Oregon’s Jane Doe decision and 
Washington’s Travis Taron are not identical; two situations likely never 
are. However, the core facts in each case were ultimately the same: 
engaged individuals faced a choice between quitting their job to relocate 
with their future spouse or remaining employed and suffering long 
commutes and familial strain. In both cases, the individuals chose to quit 
their job and maintain their relationships. 
Both Jane and Travis acted reasonably despite their different eligibility 
determinations. In Jane’s situation, she reasonably ended the stress and 
exhaustion of maintaining a job three hours away from her fiancé; for this, 
Jane’s reasonableness constituted good cause and entitled her to 
unemployment benefits.207 In Travis’s situation, he made a similarly 
reasonable choice and decided to move with his fiancée and children.208 
But, under Washington law, his reasonable choice did not constitute good 
cause justifying benefit eligibility.209 Although these cases involved two 
similarly situated claimants who made similarly reasonable choices, only 
the claimant subject to Oregon’s voluntary separation standard was 
eligible for unemployment benefits. 
B. North Dakota’s “Good Cause” Standard 
Under North Dakota law, an individual is not eligible for 
unemployment benefits if they “left [their] most recent employment 
voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer.”210 Certain 
outlined circumstances constitute good cause and therefore do not 
disqualify an individual from receiving benefits.211 These circumstances 
include leaving work: (1) due to an “illness or injury”;212 (2) due to an 
 
206. Id. at *3 (“In this case, claimant was neither married, nor was he in a domestic partnership, at 
the time he quit his employment. As such, ‘good cause’ for leaving work cannot be established 
pursuant to RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii).”). 
207. See EAB Decision 2015-EAB-0876 (Or. Aug. 24, 2015). 
208. See Taron, 2016 WL 9384209, at *1. 
209. Id. at *3. 
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(1)(a) (2019). 
211. See id. § 52-06-02(1). 
212. Id. § 52-06-02(1)(d). 
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“injury or illness caused or aggravated by the employment”;213 (3) that is 
over 200 miles away from the individual’s home in order to accept work 
which is less than 200 miles away;214 (4) to “accept a bona fide job offer 
with a[n] . . . employer who laid off the individual and with whom the 
individual has a demonstrated job attachment”;215 or (5) if the reason is 
“directly attributable to domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault.”216 
Conversely, leaving work “in anticipation of discharge or lay off” does 
not constitute good cause.217 
Even with the various good cause situations outlined above, North 
Dakota’s unemployment statutes are rather sparse. As a result, case law 
has played a large role in filling the gaps as to what constitutes good cause. 
Accordingly, North Dakota courts read “good cause” to mean “a reason 
for abandoning one’s employment which would impel a reasonably 
prudent person to do so under the same or similar circumstances.”218 
Additionally, good cause must be “attributable to the employer,”219 which 
North Dakota courts have refined to mean a cause “produced, caused, 
created or as a result of actions by the employer.”220 
North Dakota’s unemployment administrative agency—Job Service 
North Dakota (Job Service)—and courts also markedly account for the 
state’s unemployment law’s declaration of public policy221 when 
determining an individual’s eligibility.222 This policy provides that 
individuals should be compensated “during periods when they become 
unemployed through no fault of their own.”223 Moreover, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has declared that “as long as a worker exhibits 
genuine commitment to working and is unemployed through no fault of 
his or her own, that worker is entitled to unemployment compensation.”224 
 
213. Id. § 52-06-02 (1)(e). 
214. Id. § 52-06-02 (1)(h). 
215. Id. § 52-06-02 (1)(i). 
216. Id. § 52-06-02 (1)(j). 
217. Id. § 52-06-02(1)(f). 
218. Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118, 123 (N.D. 1990). 
219. N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(1)(a) (2019). 
220. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122 (citing Couch v. N.C. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 366 S.E.2d 574, 577 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988)); see, e.g., id. (illustrating that “a change in one’s work hours is attributable to 
the employer”). 
221. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05. 
222. See Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121 (construing North Dakota’s unemployment benefit 
disqualification law with the statute’s public policy to give full effect to the legislature’s intent and, 
because it is remedial legislation, strike the balance in favor of the employee). 
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05. 
224. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. 
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North Dakota’s “well-established public policy”225 strikes a balance 
“between the rights of the unemployed worker who genuinely wants to 
work . . . and the protection of the former employer from quits that have 
nothing to do with the employer or the employment.”226 A genuine 
attachment to the labor market “may be evidenced by the effort an 
employee exerts to preserve her employment and is evidence that an 
employee’s unemployment is not caused by her own fault.”227 Along those 
lines, North Dakota courts interpret “fault” to mean a “failure to make 
reasonable efforts to preserve one’s employment.”228 
The North Dakota Supreme Court emphasizes that unemployment 
statutes, as remedial legislation, must be “liberally construed in favor of 
the purposes obviously intended.”229 Therefore, the balance of North 
Dakota’s unemployment laws must be struck in favor of the employee to 
“soften the harsh impact of involuntary unemployment.”230 
1. Case Comparison: North Dakota vs. Washington 
In the unemployment benefits context, North Dakota stands out given 
its high recipiency rate: about seven out of ten jobless workers receive 
unemployment benefits.231 This statistic nationally and in Washington 
drops to an average of about three for every ten jobless workers who 
receive unemployment benefits.232 A review of North Dakota 
unemployment decisions also reveals that, in comparison to Washington, 
North Dakota stands out given its focus on effectuating and promoting its 
law’s public policy.233 The following cases are factually similar only in 
that both claimants listed multiple reasons for quitting their jobs.234 The 
relevant analysis, however, arises from the fact that the courts in each case 
place different levels of emphasis on effectuating their respective state’s 
public policy. 
 
225. Vogel Law Firm, Checks and Balances: Your Role in Unemployment Compensation Claims, 
17 N.D. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2012). 
226. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. 
227. Id. at 124. 
228. Id. at 122. 
229. Willits v. Job Serv. N.D., 2011 ND 135, 799 N.W.2d 374, 377. 
230. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. 
231. WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 12. 
232. Id. 
233. See id. at 121–22, 124; Willits, 799 N.W.2d 374, 377–78; Baier v. Job Serv. N.D., 2004 ND 
27, 673 N.W.2d 923, 926; Johnson v. Job Serv. N.D., 1999 ND 42, 590 N.W.2d 877, 880.  
234. Out of the vast amount of unemployment benefit appeals that take place, few decisions are 
published or made available to the public. Therefore, I was unable to find North Dakota decisions that 
factually resembled Washington decisions. 
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a. Newland v. Job Service North Dakota 
In the seminal North Dakota unemployment case of Newland v. Job 
Service North Dakota,235 Job Service denied North Dakota resident Joy 
Newland’s claim for unemployment benefits on the basis that she had left 
her “employment without good cause attributable to her employer.”236 
Newland worked for “approximately one-and-a-half years as a utility 
clerk and order filler for Dakota Drug, Inc.,” where her normal hours were 
from 7:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.237 One day, however, Newland was 
informed that her schedule would change to a new shift running from “at 
least 4:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. or later, as required to complete [her] 
work.”238 Although the shift change “did not involve either an increase or 
reduction in hours,” the time Newland was to begin and end work each 
day became uncertain and variable.239 As a wife and mother of three 
children, an unpredictable schedule including night work was not feasible 
for Newland.240 
When Job Service initially denied Newland’s unemployment benefits 
claim, Newland introduced evidence to support three reasons for her 
resignation, which were: (1) a substantial change in work hours; (2) an 
inability to locate child care past 7 p.m. in her community; and (3) the 
excessive cost of child care.241 Even with these factors in mind, Job 
Service determined that Newland quit because the cost of child care made 
it “economically [im]practical for her to continue” working.242 
Additionally, Job Service found that Newland’s reason for quitting—
parental obligations—was personal and not attributable to the employer 
as required to constitute good cause under the state’s statute.243 
On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
the case.244 Notably, the Court focused its holding on the state’s public 
policy of “soften[ing] the harsh impact of involuntary unemployment.”245 
The Court reasoned that “[o]bviously, both Job Service and this Court 
 
235. 460 N.W.2d 118, 123 (N.D. 1990). 




240. Id. To make matters more difficult, Newland’s husband already worked night shifts. Id. 
Therefore, Newland’s new schedule would require the family to locate child care to cover when both 
Newland and her husband worked in the evening. Id. at 122. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 120. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 121.  
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must construe the governing statutes to promote the public policy of this 
State.”246 With this in mind, however, the Court recognized that 
“[n]othing in our unemployment compensation law suggests that a 
claimant must rest her entire claim to compensation on one reason for 
quitting a job.”247 Although one of Newland’s reasons—lack of child 
care—may not have constituted good cause to quit, the Court instructed 
Job Service to “consider all reasons which may have combined to give the 
claimant good cause to quit.”248 By weighing all asserted reasons relating 
to a job separation, the agency could properly determine whether “the 
employee . . . made a good faith effort to remain ‘attached to the labor 
market’ but did not succeed through ‘no fault’ of her own,” thus furthering 
the state’s public policy.249 The Newland Court’s stance on emphasizing 
the unemployment law’s public policy is representative of the state’s 
overall eligibility determinations.250 
b. Washington’s Wendy K. Rivera 
In contrast, Wendy K. Rivera251 demonstrates how the Employment 
Security Act’s purpose is not at the forefront of eligibility determinations 
in Washington. Wendy Rivera resided in Washington and worked as a 
Monitor Tech CNA from 2006 until 2010.252 After separating from her 
job, Rivera and her husband permanently relocated to Phoenix, Arizona, 
to live near their twenty-six-year-old daughter.253 
When filing for Washington unemployment benefits, Rivera indicated 
that the primary reason she quit was because her daughter was having 
legal problems.254 Rivera explained that her daughter had violated her 
parole and spent a week in jail.255 Following this incident, it became 
evident to Rivera that her daughter needed her parent’s guidance, thus 
 
246. Id. at 122. 
247. Id. “[U]nder the [North Dakota] statute, as long as a worker exhibits a genuine commitment 
to working and is unemployed through no fault of his or her own, that worker is entitled to receive 
unemployment compensation.” Id. at 121. 
248. Id. at 122. 
249. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05 (2019)). 
250. See Willits v. Job Serv. N.D., 2011 ND 135, 799 N.W.2d 374, 377–78; Baier v. Job Serv. 
N.D., 2004 ND 27, 673 N.W.2d 923, 926; Johnson v. Job Serv. N.D., 1999 ND 42, 590 N.W.2d 877, 
880. 
251. No. 959, 2010 WL 6795725 (Emp. Sec. Comm’r 2010). 
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prompting Rivera and her husband to move to be near their daughter.256 
Rivera wrote in her benefits application that her resignation was 
“necessary” because her daughter would have been without her mother 
when she needed her most and that this essential parental support would 
be long term.257 In response to ESD’s request for more information, 
Rivera wrote that she was “[m]oving to Arizona to be near [her] kids” and 
that she “[didn’t] think [the ESD employee] needed to know the details” 
given their personal nature.258 
After ESD initially denied her benefits, Rivera informed the ALJ at her 
hearing that in addition to quitting for her daughter’s legal problems, “her 
daughter was being abused by a man she was dating and needed 
protection.”259 Rivera testified that when she had arrived in Phoenix, she 
found her daughter “emaciated” and “bruised.”260 Moreover, Rivera 
explained that “the protection she provides to her daughter consists of 
making regular visits to her daughter’s residence to see if the boyfriend is 
around and to check her daughter for signs of abuse, such as bruising.”261 
The ALJ found Rivera ineligible for benefits, and the Commissioner’s 
Review Office later affirmed this decision.262 While acknowledging that 
part of Rivera’s reason for quitting was to protect her daughter from 
domestic violence, the Commissioner’s decision noted that the “totality of 
the evidence” illustrated that Rivera’s “primary reason” for quitting her 
job was to “relocate nearby her daughter . . . to provide long-term, 
personal parental support and guidance to her daughter concerning her 
daughter’s lifestyle and legal problems.”263 
Quitting one’s job in order to protect an immediate family member 
from domestic violence is one of the eleven good cause reasons under 
Washington’s unemployment laws.264 The Commissioner even analyzed 
whether the situation met the statutory requirements for leaving one’s job 
 
256. Id.  
257. Id. at *1–2. 
258. Id. at *2. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at *3. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at *1.  
263. Id. at *3. 
264. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iv) (2020); see also id. § 26.50.010(3) (defining 
“[d]omestic violence”); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-150-112(1) (2020) (defining “[i]mmediate 
family [member]”); id. § 192-150-113 (expanding on “[d]omestic violence” as a good cause reason 
to resign by explaining that “you are not required to exhaust reasonable alternatives prior to leaving 
work,” the “amount of notice you provide to your employer” will not be a factor of the situation’s 
good cause determination, and listing other factors to be considered). 
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to protect a family member from domestic violence.265 Among other 
things, the Commissioner determined that Rivera’s daughter was a 
member of her “immediate family” and that Rivera’s daughter had a 
“dating relationship with the alleged abuser.”266 Ultimately, however, 
none of this analysis made a difference to Rivera’s eligibility. Because the 
evidence did not establish that Rivera’s “primary reason” for leaving work 
was due to the domestic violence her daughter was experiencing, Rivera 
did not have good cause to leave her employment.267 
Notably, the Commissioner based this decision on two factors.268 The 
first factor was the timeframe of Rivera’s decision to quit and relocate.269 
The second, more relevant factor was that Rivera’s situation did not 
satisfy the statutory requirement that the resignation be “necessary” 
because, as the Commissioner explained, “there [was] no evidence that 
law enforcement or victim abuse advocates could not have provided 
protection”; rather, “the type of protection” Rivera would be able to 
provide her daughter was “de minimis.”270 In the Rivera decision, there is 
no mention of the Washington Employment Security Act’s declaration of 
public policy. 
2. Derived Reasoning 
Newland and Rivera illustrate how placing varying levels of emphasis 
on a statute’s purpose can render different outcomes. When faced with 
multiple reasons for an employee’s voluntary separation, North Dakota’s 
public policy tips the balance in favor of the employee to consider all the 
quit related reasons the employee asserts.271 Unemployment 
 
265. Rivera, 2010 WL 6795725, at *3–4.  
266. Id. Moreover, “it [was] of no legal consequence whether claimant’s daughter lived with 
claimant at the time claimant quit or after claimant moved to Phoenix,” the Commissioner continued, 
“[or] that the alleged perpetrator of domestic violence was claimant’s daughter’s boyfriend . . . [or] 
that claimant did not notify her employer that she was relocating to protect her daughter from domestic 
violence.” Id. 
267. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
268. Id.  
269. Id. The Commissioner questioned the timeline of Rivera’s job separation because of “the 
lengthy delay between the alleged criminal assault for which the boyfriend was charged and [Rivera]’s 
decision to quit and relocate.” Id. To support the necessity of her job separation, Rivera had submitted 
a letter dated January 7, 2010, from the City of Phoenix, Office of the City Prosecutor, Victim Services 
identifying Rivera’s daughter “as a victim in connection with charges of assault and criminal damage 
filed by the prosecutor against a male defendant.” Id. at *2. Rivera resigned from her position nearly 
five months later in May and did not move to Phoenix until June. Id. at *4. Therefore, the 
Commissioner did not find Rivera’s assertion that her primary reason for quitting was to protect her 
daughter to be credible. Id. 
270. Id. at *5. 
271. Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1990). 
Fleming (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  5:09 PM 
2020] WASHINGTON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 307 
 
compensation exists to minimize the suffering caused by involuntary 
unemployment;272 North Dakota can accomplish this goal only by fully 
accounting for an individual’s situation, their job attachment and effort to 
remain a part of the workforce, and any possible alternatives to 
unemployment. An employee can quit their job for a variety of reasons. 
Precluding an individual’s eligibility merely because one of their asserted 
reasons does not constitute good cause would hinder North Dakota’s 
public policy. 
Conversely, ESD and Washington courts rarely account for the public 
policy of the state’s unemployment laws when analyzing an employee’s 
voluntary resignation. This is likely the result of the legislature’s choice 
to structure the law as a one-size-fits-all list that precludes any extraneous 
considerations. Even facing Rivera’s compelling situation, ESD found 
Rivera ineligible for benefits because relocating to protect her daughter 
from domestic violence was not her “primary reason” for quitting.273 
Understandably, a parent could be hesitant to divulge personal familial 
information to a state agency, which is illustrated by Rivera’s statement 
that she did not feel the need to disclose further details concerning her job 
separation.274 Moreover, it is arguable whether a parent’s job separation 
to protect their daughter from domestic violence could even be considered 
a voluntary choice, or whether a parent has no choice but to protect their 
family.275 Either way, sufficiently accounting for a state’s public policy, 
and especially remedial legislation’s purpose, can produce varying results. 
C. Pennsylvania’s Voluntary Quit Provision 
Under Pennsylvania law, an employee is ineligible for unemployment 
benefits if their job loss “is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause 
of a necessitous and compelling nature.”276 Although the state has not 
defined “cause of a necessitous and compelling nature,”277 the statutory 
structure outlines various situations that do not qualify as such a cause. 
For one, a voluntary resignation due to a disability when “the employer is 
able to provide other suitable work” does not constitute the requisite 
 
272. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05 (2019). 
273. Rivera, 2010 WL 6795727, at *3. 
274. Id. at *2. 
275. See, e.g., Camille Carey & Robert A. Solomon, Impossible Choices: Balancing Safety and 
Security in Domestic Violence Representation, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 201 (2014) (discussing the 
“impossible choice” victims of domestic violence face when deciding between safety or financial 
security, considering enforcement of sanctions against the abuser may ultimately deprive the victim 
of financial support in the form of child support or alimony).  
276. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 802(b) (2020). 
277. Id. 
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cause.278 Additionally, an individual will be ineligible for benefits if they 
left work because of a “stoppage of work” resulting from a labor dispute 
the employee was involved in,279 when engaged in self-employment,280 or 
when leaving work “to preserve the employe[e]’s existing entitlement to 
a pension.”281 
Conversely, Pennsylvania will not disqualify an employee when they 
would have been required to “join or remain a member of a company 
union . . . resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor 
organization,” or accept undesirable wages, hours, or conditions 
of employment.282 
Like in North Dakota, Pennsylvania courts have stepped in to expand 
on when an individual’s voluntary separation results from “cause of a 
necessitous and compelling nature.”283 Specifically, such cause “results 
from circumstances which produce pressure to terminate employment that 
is both real and substantial, and . . . would compel a reasonable person 
under the circumstances to act in the same manner.”284 Thus, Pennsylvania 
utilizes a reasonable person standard.285 
1. Case Comparison: Pennsylvania vs. Washington 
Pennsylvania’s voluntary resignation law is similar to those of both 
Oregon and North Dakota because all three are standard-based systems 
that judge an individual’s benefit eligibility by objective standards.286 
Pennsylvania’s system stands out, however, given the “broad flexibility 
of its voluntary quits provision”287 as well as protection of “care-giving 
workers from biased assumptions by agency adjudicators.”288 
 
278. Id. 
279. Id. § 802(d). 
280. Id. § 802(h). 
281. Id. § 802(k). 
282. Id. 
283. See Taylor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 378 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1977); Truitt v. 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 589 A.2d 208 (Pa. 1991); Allegheny Valley Sch. v. 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 697 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1997). 
284. Taylor, 378 A.2d at 832–33. 
285. Id.; Truitt, 589 A.2d at 210. 
286. For Oregon’s reasonable person standard, see supra text accompanying notes 171–172. For 
North Dakota’s reasonable person standard, see supra text accompanying note 218. For 
Pennsylvania’s reasonable person standard, see supra text accompanying notes 284–285. 
287. McConnell, supra note 159, at 126. 
288. Id. at 129. Unlike most other states, Pennsylvania does not condition benefit eligibility on a 
worker’s “24-7 availability.” Id. at 128. Rather, “[i]ts statute omits the requirement that claimants be 
immediately willing and able to accept all suitable work. This provision has been interpreted as 
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Historically, unemployment benefit systems have failed to adequately 
address the expanding role of women in the workplace and their 
corresponding reduced role as care-givers.289 Women are often 
disadvantaged as unemployment benefit claimants because “many of the 
time-honored rules and practices of unemployment insurance law arise 
from the male breadwinner model.”290 In this context, women may face 
constrained duties as both employees and mothers.291 Whether or not a 
state’s unemployment system accounts for this problem depends on its 
good cause definition. Two compelling cases from Washington and 
Pennsylvania demonstrate how each state’s respective good cause law has 
varying impacts on women’s eligibility when they quit their jobs due to 
care-giving obligations. 
a. Pennsylvania’s Truitt v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review 
In Truitt v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,292 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the lower unemployment agency’s 
denial of Kathleen Truitt’s unemployment benefits. Truitt, a single mother 
of two young children, worked full-time for a trucking company for over 
six years.293 After the trucking company cut her hours to part-time, Truitt 
began receiving partial unemployment benefits until—as required to 
remain eligible for benefits—she applied for other jobs and secured a 
waitress position at T.G.I. Fridays.294 During Truitt’s waitressing shifts, 
Truitt’s mother would care for and watch her children.295 
About a month into her new job, Truitt’s mother broke a bone in her 
elbow, rendering her unable to drive a vehicle to her daughter’s home, 
cook, provide transportation for the children, or otherwise adequately care 
for the children.296 Two days after her mother’s injury, Truitt was 
 
providing a presumption that a worker who registers for unemployment is available for work, which 
protects care-giving workers from biased assumptions by agency adjudicators.” Id. at 128–29 
(footnote omitted). 
289. Richard McHugh & Ingrid Kock, Unemployment Insurance: Responding to the Expanding 
Role of Women in the Work Force, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1422, 1423, n.8 (1994) (“In 1970, 28.7 
percent of mothers with children under the age of six were in the workforce. By 1990, 58.2 percent 
of mothers of young children were in the workforce.”). 
290. Id. at 1424. 
291. See id. at 1422–24. 
292. 589 A.2d 208 (Pa. 1991). 
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scheduled to work a late night shift.297 Both Truitt and her mother reached 
out to family members, former babysitters, and day care centers in an 
effort to find replacement care for the children, but no care was available 
after 6 p.m.298 Because she had only worked four weeks at T.G.I. Fridays, 
Truitt had not yet accrued any sick leave or vacation time.299 Truitt 
“requested that her employer place her in a position that required only day 
shift work, but this request was denied.”300 With no other option but to 
“risk the safety and well-being of her children by leaving them home alone 
until 3:00 in the morning,” Truitt voluntarily ended her employment.301 
Using Pennsylvania’s reasonable person standard, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reversed the agency’s decision—which the lower court 
had affirmed—and stated that based on “the hours that [Truitt] was 
required to work, we believe that any reasonable person who had to find 
child care on this short notice would have done what [Truitt] did.”302 The 
Court reasoned that “the sudden physical disability of a trusted baby-sitter 
and the unavailing search for a replacement within two days produced 
both ‘real and substantial pressure’ on [Truitt] to terminate her 
employment.”303 Based on Truitt’s good faith efforts to maintain her 
employment and find other sources of reliable child care, the Court did 
not find Truitt at fault for her job loss; rather, she did what any reasonable 
person would do under the circumstances.304 
Moreover, the Court touched on the adverse public policy incentives 
that arise under a contrary decision.305 The Court noted that employees 
“need not place their children with strangers or unchecked day care 
agencies in order to show that they have met the aforesaid standards that 







302. Id. at 210. When reflecting on Truitt’s actions in working with her employer to switch shifts 
and attempting to find alternative child care, the Court noted that “[t]here is nothing more that we can 
or should ask of an employee before that employee terminates his or her employment.” Id. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. In addition to noting that Truitt’s “efforts to provide for her family were commendable,” 
the Court applauded her good faith adherence to her benefit eligibility requirements that mandated 
she accept the position at T.G.I. Fridays in the first place. Id. The Court acknowledged that “[Truitt] 
could have stayed home and collected unemployment compensation benefits after the trucking 
company, where she had been earning $11.89 an hour, laid her off. But no! She instead obtained 
employment as a waitress where her base pay was $2.01 an hour.” Id. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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b. Washington’s Sennott v. Department of Employment Security 
Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals analyzed a factually 
similar case in Sennott v. Department of Employment Security.307 For four 
years, Kelly Sennott—a single mother of two young children—worked as 
an office manager at a medical clinic.308 Before going to work each 
morning, Sennott would wake her children up at 7:15 a.m. and drop them 
off at her parents’ house.309 After separating from her office manager 
position for reasons not stated in the record, Sennott began receiving 
unemployment benefits.310 She followed the requisite requirements in 
order to maintain her eligibility, including seeking out and accepting 
suitable employment.311 
Consequently, Sennott applied for and accepted a job as a server and 
cashier for Triple 7 Restaurant and Bar.312 Although she originally 
believed the restaurant had hired her for a position that involved 
“occasional very early morning shifts,” Sennott testified during her 
unemployment hearing that she realized “right after . . . [taking] the job, 
that [she] probably should never have taken it” given the 5:30 a.m. starting 
shifts.313 Rather, she ended up accepting the job because she “thought it 
was the right thing to do” because of the unemployment benefit 
requirement that claimants apply for and accept work.314 
Upon starting the job, Sennott was scheduled to work twenty-five hours 
each week, and all of her shifts except one within her first month were 
scheduled to begin at 5:30 a.m.315 Working this schedule required Sennott 
to wake her children up at 3:30 a.m. to take them to her parents’ house, 
which Sennott described to her employer and during testimony as “not 
really feasible for [her children].”316 Therefore, Sennott quit after four 
days of work.317 
On appeal, Sennott argued that she had not quit her job; instead, she 
had “refused new work that was not suitable.”318 Because Sennott initially 
 
307. No. 78673-3-I, 2019 WL 3110780 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). 





313. Id. at *3. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at *1. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at *3. 
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believed the job involved occasional early morning shifts, she contended 
that learning all her shifts would begin at 5:30 a.m. constituted a 
“substantial change in working conditions” that gave her the right to 
refuse the offer and continue receiving benefits.319 
Despite Sennott’s efforts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Commissioner’s findings.320 First, the court found that Sennott’s 
realization that she “probably should never have taken [the job]” due to 
the early shifts constituted her knowledge of the early morning hours and 
refuted her argument that the schedule constituted a “substantial change 
in working conditions” or an offer of “new work.”321 Second, the court 
affirmed the Commissioner’s finding that Sennott had voluntarily quit 
without good cause.322 Although Sennott “may have had a very good 
reason to quit her employment due to a lack of child care,” the 
Commissioner stated that “a good reason does not necessarily equate to a 
‘good cause’ basis for her voluntary quit for the purpose of unemployment 
insurance.”323 Because Washington’s voluntary resignation law is limited 
to the exclusive statutory situations, “[l]ack of childcare [was] not a good 
cause reason.”324 
2. Derived Reasoning 
The essence of both situations that Truitt and Sennott faced as mothers 
was similar. Each individual was receiving unemployment benefits and 
applied for and accepted work as required to maintain their benefit 
eligibility. Further, each owed obligations to their employer as an 
employee and to their children as a care-giver. When faced with 
constrained duties under each role, Truitt and Sennott acted reasonably 
and chose to care for their children rather than leave them unattended or 
wake them up at very early hours. 
Neither Pennsylvania nor Washington has a specific provision in their 
respective voluntary separation laws that outlines when a mother or 
care-giver has good cause to quit as a result of their care-giving duties. 
Consequently, neither Truitt’s nor Sennott’s situation fit squarely within 
a good cause exception. This is where a flexible, standard-based system—
like Pennsylvania’s—benefits individuals. Pennsylvania is able to take 
any circumstance and consider whether the employee’s reason for quitting 
 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at *4. 
321. Id. at *3–4.  
322. Id.  
323. Id. at *1. 
324. Id. 
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was “of a necessitous and compelling nature” and thus constituted good 
cause.325 In comparison, Washington’s restrictive, rule-based system 
cannot even consider such a situation if it does not fall within one of the 
eleven enumerated reasons.326 
Even with this limitation in place, Washington courts have recognized 
“serious policy concerns” and noted that “unemployment laws can 
disfavor parents who have to juggle their responsibilities to their children 
with their need for employment outside the home.”327 With the current 
good cause definition, however, neither ESD nor the courts can address 
these policy concerns; Washington claimants are not given any chance of 
eligibility for resigning due to care-giving responsibilities not fitting into 
the one-size-fits-all list. 
Parents in both Pennsylvania and Washington likely face similar 
tensions between their parental and employment obligations. Only in 
Pennsylvania, however, can a care-giver’s parental obligations possibly 
constitute good cause to quit their job.328 Parents in Pennsylvania do not 
face unique hardships in finding child care that Washington parents are 
immune to. The fact that parents in Pennsylvania—but not in 
Washington—are eligible to receive benefits under these circumstances 
reflects an unfair legislative choice that disadvantages Washington 
parents. 
Moreover, receiving unemployment benefits due to conflicts with 
parental obligations is not automatic. Truitt illustrates that parents must 
still show good faith efforts to attain child care and are disqualified if their 
inability to find adequate care does not result in necessitous and 
compelling reasons to end their employment.329 Like the Truitt Court 
noted, Truitt’s “efforts to provide for her family were commendable”: she 
attempted to arrange a different schedule with her employer, which her 
employer declined, and she and her mother reached out to multiple 
potential child care sources.330 Rather than merely allege an inability to 
find child care and receive benefits, the claimant bears the burden of 
establishing the existence of necessitous and compelling reasons forcing 
them to quit.331 
 
325. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 802(b) (2020). 
326. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (2020); Sennott, 2019 WL 3110780, at *1 
(explaining that for the purpose of Washington’s voluntary separation law, “a good reason [to quit] 
does not necessarily equate to a ‘good cause’ basis” that entitles an individual to benefits). 
327. Ali v. Emp. Sec. Dep’t, No. 76655-4-I, 2018 WL 3738798, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). 
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Adverse consequences can and do result if the law forces parents to 
choose between their work schedules or leaving children unattended.332 
Children may incur injuries that require medical attention, discover 
at-home hazards like cleaning chemicals, or risk allowing intruders or 
other unknown visitors into the home.333 Additionally, like in Sennott, 
work schedules requiring parents to wake their children up at early hours 
to take them to child care could result in harmful circumstances. Children 
need a proper night’s sleep to support their physical and mental 
development.334 Not getting the proper amount of sleep can lead to weight 
gain, trouble in school, bad judgment, or long-term psychological effects 
such as depression or anxiety.335 By deemphasizing children’s well-being 
and health in favor of maintaining employment, Washington’s good cause 
standard forces parents to face conflicting duties and negative 
consequences. 
Additionally, an employee’s joblessness due to their parental 
obligations or lack of child care is often involuntary. If a caretaker 
becomes unavailable, the lack of child care alternatives bears no causal 
relationship to the parent’s actions.336 Although Washington has 
recognized this concern in cases such as Sennott, its laws do not 
appropriately account for such situations. 
IV. PROPOSED “GOOD CAUSE” DEFINITION 
No two states regulate their unemployment compensation systems 
under the same set of rules and guidelines.337 For example, comparing the 
unemployment laws of Oregon, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington highlights each system’s unique qualities. In particular, the 
laws of Oregon, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania offer models of 
voluntary resignation eligibility standards that more adequately confront 
 
332. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, FACTSHEET FOR FAMILIES: LEAVING YOUR CHILD HOME 
ALONE 3 (2018), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/homealone.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGH9-
XVJ5]. 
333. Id. 
334. Christopher Curley, Only Half of U.S. Children Get Enough Sleep: Why That’s a Serious 
Problem, HEALTHLINE WEBMD (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/children-
lack-of-sleep-health-problems#How-to-help-kids-sleep-better  [https://perma.cc/7ZJM-4S9Y]; 
R.  Morgan  Griffin,  This  Is  Your  Kid’s  Brain  Without  Sleep,  WEBMD,  https://www.webmd. 
com/parenting/raising-fit-kids/recharge/features/brain-without-sleep#1  [https://perma.cc/V4RS-
48KQ]. 
335. Griffin, supra note 334. 
336. While a lack of child care does not bear a causal relationship to the employer’s actions, 
unemployment compensation laws must be liberally construed to effectuate their purpose, which 
would thus lean in favor of the employee. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2020). 
337. See generally WHERE STATES ARE, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
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the realities of no-fault job separations in comparison to Washington’s 
law. Therefore, I suggest a legislative amendment to Washington’s good 
cause provision that borrows from these states’ laws. I propose that 
Washington repeal its exclusive good cause list and adopt a 
standard-based approach, like the following, in its place: An employee 
will be found to have voluntarily left their work with good cause if the 
cause was of such a necessitous and compelling nature that a reasonable 
and prudent person of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common 
sense, would have left work. 
This standard encapsulates three principles, each derived from the 
unemployment systems of Oregon, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. 
First, by repealing the exclusive good cause list, ESD and Washington 
courts could more freely effectuate the law’s public policy—a principle at 
the forefront of the North Dakota system.338 The Washington legislature 
chose to favor big business when it enacted its exclusive good cause list;339 
however, the legislature must balance those interests with the interests of 
those who unemployment compensation is intended to protect: workers. 
Absent such a restrictive determination of what constitutes good cause, 
North Dakota is unobstructed in its ability to advance the purpose of 
remedial legislation as a whole and grant benefits to those “unemployed 
through no fault of their own.”340 
Washington’s current legislation prohibits ESD and the courts from 
looking outside of the eleven reasons when determining whether an 
individual’s voluntary separation constitutes good cause. This effectively 
excludes from consideration the law’s “purpose of reducing involuntary 
unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to the minimum.”341 Such 
a system that asserts its purpose but has no way of fulfilling it is inapposite 
and should be repealed. 
Second, the suggested provision would require cause of a “necessitous 
and compelling nature”342 to justify an employee’s voluntary resignation, 
a provision derived from Pennsylvania’s law. Such a standard sets a high 
bar for eligibility to protect against potential moral hazard. Not just any 
minor inconvenience could provide an individual with good cause to quit 
their job; rather, the driving reason would have to be so compelling and 
forceful that the employee was left with no reasonable alternative but to 
quit. Moreover, the cause would need to rise to the level of creating “real 
 
338. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05 (2019). 
339. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
340. N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05. 
341. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010. 
342. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 802(b) (2020). 
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and substantial pressure”343 to leave one’s job. Therefore, protective 
limitations would still be in place while allowing the intent of 
Washington’s laws to ring true. 
This standard would also efficiently serve the Employment Security 
Act’s purpose. Not only would there be an objective basis upon which to 
determine an employee’s eligibility, but ESD and Washington courts 
would have flexibility and discretion in limited circumstances. For 
example, ESD and Washington courts could account for a claimant’s good 
faith efforts to find child care when determining if their job loss was 
through no fault of their own.344 
Third, the proposal utilizes Oregon’s refined “reasonable person” 
standard by including the language of “a reasonable and prudent person 
of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense.”345 Rather than 
a mere reasonable person standard, the statute would provide employees 
with a specific basis that sets forth detailed expectations that their 
behavior must align with. Eligibility would depend on the employee’s 
reasonability, prudence, and exercise of common sense when faced with 
a situation compelling them to quit. As a result, ESD might consider 
questions such as: Did the employee give their employer a reasonable 
amount of time to correct the unsafe or illegal working condition prior to 
quitting? Did the employee exercise ordinary common sense by 
requesting a leave of absence in order to find reliable child care and then 
return to work? Did the employee prudently seek out other available 
positions within the company to avoid working with the supervisor who 
was causing their heightened anxiety symptoms? Only once an employee 
illustrated they took all steps that a “reasonable and prudent person of 
normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense,”346 would have 
taken under the circumstances would they have good cause to quit. 
Overall, this proposal would accomplish many important goals. For 
one, expanding good cause eligibility would entitle a greater proportion 
of individuals to receive unemployment benefits, thus protecting the 
health and well-being of Washingtonians during the tough times that 
unemployment entails. Unemployment compensation legislation is 
remedial in nature, meaning it should weigh in favor of helping a state’s 
citizens. Currently, Washington’s system fails to effectuate the Act’s 
purpose of “reducing involuntary unemployment” and the suffering that 
 
343. Truitt v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 589 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa. 1991). 
344. See supra section III.c.i.1; Truitt, 589 A.2d 208. 
345. OR. ADMIN. R. 471-030-0038(4) (2020). 
346. Id. 
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results from it.347 The range of circumstances that may render an 
individual “unemployed through no fault of their own”348 far exceeds any 
possibility of limiting such reasons to a one-size-fits-all list; therefore, 
such an attempt to do so must be repealed. 
Additionally, the standard this Comment proposes could help buttress 
the economy during recessions, such as the economic fallout following 
the COVID-19 pandemic. As has been experienced first-hand by many 
Washingtonians, unemployment compensation plays a pivotal role not 
only in supporting families in need but also in protecting against the harms 
of recessions. The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the importance of 
a strong unemployment insurance system. Therefore, now is a better time 
than any to make a change to the current unemployment system in order 
to protect and benefit those who have become jobless through no fault of 
their own. Because the future of Washington’s economy is unknown, the 
state’s legislature must take immediate and important steps in fixing its 
unemployment compensation system. 
CONCLUSION 
A one-size-fits-all approach can never adequately determine when 
individuals who voluntarily separate from their jobs should be eligible for 
unemployment benefits. As it now stands, however, Washington’s 
Employment Security Act imposes such an approach. It outlines eleven 
reasons—and only eleven reasons—that provide an individual with good 
cause to leave their job. Such a standard is too restrictive. It frustrates the 
legislation’s “purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment and the 
suffering caused thereby to the minimum”349 by stripping ESD and 
Washington courts of the flexibility necessary to effectuate this purpose. 
Therefore, Washington should look to other states’ unemployment 
compensation systems and craft a new standard. 
After comparing Washington’s voluntary separation provision with 
those of Oregon, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, I suggest that 
Washington eliminate its exclusive list and redefine “good cause” as cause 
of such a necessitous and compelling nature that a reasonable and prudent 
person of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense, would 
have left work. Expanding benefit eligibility is an essential step in 
alleviating the harms of an ongoing recession spurred by COVID-19 and 
preparing the state for future economic fluctuations. Washington’s 
legislature must act now. 
 
347. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2020). 
348. Id. 
349. Id. 
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